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Abstract
In the wake of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, policy makers have focused on the public health
components which led to the outbreak, the international response, efforts to control and mitigate
the impact of the outbreak, and the research and development resulting from the pandemic. Some
of the most enlightening aspects of the outbreak pertain to National Security, as the crisis
demonstrated crucial failure within the United States to effectively respond to future pandemics
or bioterrorist attacks. Upon a closer examination, the Ebola crisis demonstrated the American
public’s susceptibility to mass-panic, the lack of a centralized command structure, and the United
States’ inability to develop a pragmatic, centralized response to a biological incident. The lessons
learned for this incident, offer a blue print for policymakers to consider, when crafting policy to
respond to short comings in security policy.

Introduction
The 2014 Ebola pandemic, at first glance, is an interesting case study in public health. It
demonstrates the many policy failures of public health organizations, as well as the everwidening gap between the promise of modern medicine and the developing world. Upon further
examination, however, the national security relevance of the outbreak becomes quite clear. In
today’s sophisticated and globally integrated economy, the public health concerns of one nation
affect the wellbeing of others. With the constant transportation of goods and persons across
international borders, the United States must pragmatically address public health and security
concerns in conjunction.
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The 2014 outbreak quickly escalated and grew into the deadliest Ebola outbreak the
world has ever known, evolving into a national security priority for the United States (Obama,
2014). National security resources were allocated to help combat the spread of the virus within
the African continent through the distribution of aid and expertise. Domestically, many security
personnel were instrumental in screening ports of entry to prevent the proliferation of the disease
throughout the western world. More importantly however, the “Ebola crisis” demonstrated the
many vulnerabilities of the United States in regards to both policy and public psyche, which
could be exploited in conjunction with a bioterrorism attack.

Global Pandemics and National Security
When trying to understand the link between national security and public health, it’s
important to note the difference between a pandemic and epidemic. An epidemic is an infectious
outbreak which stays within a specific geographical area, and occurs when the number of
infected persons rises well above what is expected within a city, county, state, or region
(Nordqvist, 2016). When an epidemic is spread amongst people and spills across geographic
borders, affecting several populations with the same infection, then the epidemic has elevated to
a pandemic. Pandemic is derived from the Greek word, pandemos, meaning, “pertaining to all
people,” and is an outbreak of global proportions (Nordqvist, 2016). This is best demonstrated
with the influenza virus, more popularly known as the flu. Influenza is a common virus with
seasonal outbreaks (Nordqvist, 2016). Generally considered to be endemic in nature, influenza
can evolve into a pandemic when a new strain (or subtype) emerges which people have no
immunity against and thus are more susceptible to infection (Nordqvist, 2016). When a new
virus or strand is discovered, the virus can quickly spread from person-to-person worldwide

Reflecting Back on the Ebola Outbreak and the Future of Bioterrorism
because the human population has little or no immunity towards the infection (Department of
Health, 2016). Pandemics are a naturally occurring biological tool of natural selection, used to
prevent overpopulation (Galvani & Slatkin, 2003).
The devastating power of these naturally occurring events is evidenced in episodes such
as the bubonic plague, which swept through Europe in the Middle Ages and claimed the lives of
one-third of the total population; or the infamous influenza outbreak of 1918 (the Spanish flu)
which killed an estimated 50 million people worldwide (Garrett, 2005). Many experts believe
that we are overdue for another major flu pandemic. (Gupta, 2017). The current global HIV
pandemic is estimated to affect more than 40 million people worldwide (Garrett, 2005). HIV has
made an estimated 12 million children orphans and has killed nearly twice as many people
(Garrett, 2005). The twentieth century brought tremendous growth in international trade and the
most comprehensive redistribution of people, animals, animal products, and plants in human
history (Jeffrey & Glarum, 2008). This century of integration and migration created new
opportunities for the spread of viral outbreaks. Perhaps that is why the beginning of the new
millennium has brought forth systematic viral scares: swine flu, bird flu, severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS; reported in Asia in 2003), and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS;
reported in Saudi Arabia in 2012). Each had one thing in common: the potential to evolve into a
deadly global pandemic (Jeffrey & Glarum, 2008).
The spread of infectious disease presents more than just public health threats: pandemics
threaten national security as well. Major global pandemics threaten national economies and
transform population demographics (Garrett, 2005). Youth bulges or generation gaps created by
outbreaks threaten human capital. In Africa, HIV is reducing working age populations faster than
replacements can be educated and trained. In many cases, as a global society, the response to
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these viral outbreaks has been emotionally driven and incredibly shortsighted (Garrett, 2005,). In
an increasingly globalized world, no nation can be completely insulated from the social and
economic impacts of global pandemics (Garrett, 2005).
Peter Salama, the Executive Director of the World Health Organization, emphasized the
importance of ramping up “our preparedness,” as a major pandemic will occur again (Selk,
2017). Cooperative strategies need to be implemented for dealing with global pandemics, but
they should include enough foresight and adaptability to be applicable to any pandemic which
may arise in the future. The national security concerns regarding global pandemics are quite
clear, considering their devastating potential. This is why in 2000, the United Nations Security
Council passed resolution 1308 in an attempt to check the rapid spread of the HIV virus (Garrett,
2005). The Security Council made the same declaration in September of 2014 amidst fears of a
global Ebola pandemic (Garrett, 2015). While naturally occurring epidemics are devastating,
these pale in comparison to intentionally created ones (Farmer, 2017). For this reason, the
gravest security threat pertains to the threat of bioterrorism.

The Ebola 2014 Outbreak
The 2014 Ebola Outbreak is the deadliest Ebola outbreak to date. The Ebola virus disease
(EVD) was first discovered in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1976 (Salaam-Blyther,
2014). The virus is extremely dangerous, with the case fatality rate (the percentage of infected
persons who do not survive the infection) exceeding 50% (Lister, 2014). The Ebola virus can
only be transmitted through direct contact with body fluids, so despite its mortality rate, it is
much harder to transmit than airborne virus’s like influenza (Lister, 2014). Despite public fears
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that it could, there was virtually no chance that the 2014 strand of EVD would ever become
airborne (Haelle, 2014).
There are five known strands of the Ebola virus and the Zaire strand was responsible for
the 2014 outbreak (Lister, 2014). The World Health Organization reported that by August 2014
there had been 2,615 infected cases (1,427 fatal). This is a staggering number, considering that
in the 36 years since the discovery of the Ebola virus, there had been a total of 2,387 cases of
infection (1,590 fatal) (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Even though the virus was known and the
particular strand identified, the outbreak in that one year was more infectious than all previous
outbreaks combined (Salaam-Blyther, 2014).
At the time of the 2014 outbreak, there were no drugs in existence to cure the Ebola
virus. A few courses of the experimental pharmaceutical Zmapp were developed for animal
trials, in which the drug showed promise. In July of 2014, two American health workers who
contracted Ebola in Liberia were given the drug which had not yet been tested on humans
(Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Since the drug was in its experimental stage, there were no large
quantities for mass treatment. With an estimated time of several years until a usable vaccine for
Ebola could be developed and available, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) emphasized that
the best way to prevent the spread of the virus was to the practice strategies which prevented the
spread of past outbreaks (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). These strategies included unravelling Ebola
cases by isolating and caring for the infected patients and then building a chain of transmission to
contain the spread of the virus (Frieden, 2014).
Previous Ebola outbreaks had traditionally occurred in the most rural parts of Africa.
Paradoxically, the 2014 outbreak occurred, and sequentially spread more rapidly, in developed
and urban portions of the country (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). The virus spread rapidly in nations
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like Sierra Leone and Liberia- two countries with weakened infrastructures and health systems –
worn out from decades of armed conflict. To truly help prevent the spread of Ebola, the process
begins by improving the lives of those living in Africa (Taylor, 2014). Medical resources were
inadequate in these nations unlike, the United States, where virtually any hospital in the country
has the resources to perform basic Ebola isolation (Lister, 2014).
In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) requested $45 million for the
FY2015 budget for additional Ebola research, and USAID requested $50 million in funding to
allocate to pandemic preparation through the Global Health Security Agenda (Salaam-Blyther,
2014). Through the available Overseas Contingency Operations funds, the Department of
Defense delivered supplies, constructed Ebola treatment units, and trained the public on
sanitation and mortuary practices to prevent the further spread of disease (Jansen, 2014).
Though the World Health Organization maintained that there was minimal risk of
contracting the Ebola Virus through air travel, many airlines cancelled flights into infected
nations (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Nations revoked visas and refused to allow entry to travelers
from infected regions (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). This was largely done in efforts to prevent mass
hysteria. The Department of State reported that the threat of the virus, as well as the panic
associated with it, had a negative impact on peacekeeping missions and security operations in
Africa, even outside of the affected regions (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). The total international effort
to combat the spread of Ebola was estimated to be nearly a billion dollars (Garrett, 2015). Private
charities, aid distribution organizations, western governments, and military forces have all played
a part in preventing the further spread of the virus (Garrett, 2015). With that said, the public in
the infected African nations were also responsible for the role they played in quarantining
infected persons and helping map the spread of the virus (Garrett, 2015).
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What is Bioterrorism?
Biological warfare is not a new concept: it is an attack which “involves the purposeful
creation of epidemics by enemy action” (Langmuir & Andrews, 1952). Accounts dating back to
the Middle Ages depict the use of melee weapons like swords and spears being purposely
infected with bacterial agents (Chiodo, 2015). During the twentieth century, the intended means
of manufacturing epidemics evolved to include the distribution of aerosol pathogens or the
contamination of water and food supplies (Langmuir & Andrews, 1952).
During the early part of the twentieth century, nation-states invested heavily in the
weaponization of viral agents. Though treaties have been signed preventing the “lawful” use of
biological weapons in warfare, this has not necessarily been effective. Syria under the Assad
regime and Iraq under Saddam Hussein have both been accused of using these weapons in war.
The Soviet Union covertly defied international treaties, continuing to invest millions of dollars in
research on biological agents for warfare during the Cold War (Garrett, 2012). While these
treaties have been drafted with the best of intentions, they still suffer from the lack of verification
necessary to make them enforceable (Garrett, 2012). While policy makers have been
conscientious of the threat caused by the proliferation of radiological and chemical agents, the
threat of biological agents has been largely overlooked (Farmer, 2017).
A bioterrorist attack is the deliberate release of a germ agent – either viral of bacterial –
with the intention of attacking people, animals, or crops (Bioterrorism, 2007). The only real
difference between a bioterrorist attack and a biological warfare attack is the actor responsible
for coordinating the attack and releasing the agent, and whether they are a nation-state or a nongovernmental organization. The agents released are typically found in nature, but they can also
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be altered to increase their resistance to medical treatments and enhance the communicability
between populations (Bioterrorism, 2006).
To date, a very limited number of bioterrorist attacks have been executed. In 1984,
members of the Rajneeshee cult infected 751 people with salmonella by sabotaging restaurants in
the city of The Dalles, Oregon (Elmer-DeWitt, 2001). In 1993, the Japanese doomsday cult and
terror organization, Aum Shinriky, release anthrax spores from an office building in Tokyo
(Fletcher, 2012). The group attempted nine biological attacks in total (targets included U.S.
Military bases), with diseases such as botulin, Q Fever, and cholera (Fletcher, 2012). In 2001,
anthrax spores sent through the mail killed five people (Warrick, 2010). The limited scope of
these attacks, may have downplayed the threat of bioterrorism to many.
Terror groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) have
expressed interested, and have even attempted, to use biological agents in terror plots
(Biodefense, 2016). The technical and administrative knowledge of biology and chemistry can be
acquired globally in medical schools, research programs, and laboratories, making it difficult to
prevent potential practitioners of bioterrorism from acquiring the required scientific knowledge
(Chiodo, 2015). While at one time the ability to mutate strands was restricted to advanced
research laboratories, rudimentary high school laboratories now have the ability to develop
deadly biological agents (Garrett, 2012). With relative easy, terror groups could engineer the flu
virus, making it deadlier (Selk, 2017). By combining traits of multiple strains and maximizing
the virus’ natural properties, it could become highly transmittable (Farmer, 2107). Genetically
engineered viruses have the potential to kill more people than nuclear weapons, governments
remain underprepared for that threat (Selk, 2017).
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Terrorists could be drawn to the use of biological agents because of the difficulty of
detection and the ease at which some biological agents can naturally spread through a population
(Bioterrorism, 2006). There are essentially three ways which agents could be acquired by
terrorist: they could be stolen, created in laboratory environments, or collected naturally. A
gloomy reality is that as the advancement of new technologies reduce the costs of genetic
sequencing, it will become easier and less expensive to create novel organisms (Garrett, 2012).
Bioterrorist attacks can be planned to induce maximum damage and panic with a minimum risk
of early detection. Potential agents of attack are categorized by risk (rated as an, A, B, or a C)
depending on the agent’s availability, ease of dissemination and transmission, and potential
impact (Bioterrorism, 2006). Category A agents are considered the most dangerous and
threatening to National Security. Ebola is categorized as a Category A bioagent because of its
ability to cause mass panic and disruption and the special public health actions required for
treating those infected.
Through the EVD, “mother nature has created the perfect bioweapon” (Thiessen, 2014).
Following the Paris terrorist attacks, the French have warned that terrorist organizations may
attempt to steal biological agents (Talent & Graham, 2016). The British Ministry of Defense
feared terrorists would try to acquire EVD and released a report outlining three separate
scenarios in which terror groups could successfully weaponize the virus. (Quinn, 2015) These
could be stolen from research facilities, laboratories, or government stockpiles. While the more
exotic and devastating agents (such as small pox) must be cultivated in laboratory environments
and are therefore more difficult to obtain, many biological agents are naturally occurring
(Gottron, 2002). Examples of these naturally occurring, and easier to obtain agents include:
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the hepatitis strands, yellow fever, and the Ebola virus
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(Gottron, 2002). Moreover, the Ebola virus is native to a continent where terrorist organizations
like Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State are active (Thiessen, 2014). The 21-day
incubation period allows potential jihadists more than enough time to infect themselves, then
travel to infected population centers, developing the means of mass distribution (Thiessen,
2014).
In June 2001 – months prior to the September 11th attack in New York – Dark Winter, a
senior level wargame, was run in conjunction with security think tanks and government agencies
to simulate government responses to acts of bioterrorism (Dark Winter). The simulation
demonstrated how a biological terror attack could result in mass civilian casualties, civil
disorder, institutional breakdown and lack of faith in government – compromising national
security (Dark Winter). Major challenges for policymakers included the many “fault lines”
which existed between governmental agencies, the levels of government, private healthcare
systems, and the public (Dark Winter). Breakdowns in centralized leadership and communication
could threaten containment and control. It was revealed that the healthcare system in the United
States had no surge abilities to prevent hospitals from becoming overwhelmed or to meet the
heightened demand for vaccinations (Dark Winter). Finally, targeted communications and
information management was recognized as a challenge, both in working with the media and in
disseminating important information (Dark Winter). It became very clear after the exercise that
the United States was unprepared for an act of bioterrorism. In 2010, nearly ten years after the
Dark Winter exercise, a commission created to evaluate the national emergency response
capabilities gave the nation a failing grade on its ability to respond to a bioterrorist threat
(O’Grady, 2015).
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The U.S. government has implemented a number of non-classified programs in an
attempt to prevent biological attacks. Unfortunately, two of these programs, Project BioShield
and the BioWatch Program, are woefully inadequate. Project BioShield was implemented in
2004 to encourage the development of countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear attacks (Gottron, 2014). The funding allocated for Project BioShield has been
reduced almost annually, especially during the recession years (Gottron, 2014). Congress is on
track to have spent less than half of the funding dedicated to this crucial program (Talent &
Graham, 2016). The program was successful at achieving some of its goals, such as acquiring
countermeasures for identified threats like Anthrax and Smallpox; however, countermeasures
have not been secured for more than two-thirds of the identified threats, including the plague,
typhus, and of course, Ebola (Gottron, 2014). Only through prioritization – by both the executive
and legislative branches – and a commitment to funding it accordingly, will Project BioShield
adequately provide countermeasures (Biodefense, 2016).
The BioWatch Program was created as an early warning system to identify airborne
biological weapons (Persons, 2015). The Department of Homeland Security has pushed for
funding to develop a fully automated system capable of detecting biological agents within six
hours, replacing the current manual system which can take more than a day to detect pathogens
(Persons, 2015). After review by the Government Accountability Office, however, the current
generation system was found to be inconsistent and inaccurate (Persons, 2015). One of the
current programs relied on by the United States to detect the early stages of a biological attack
has been determined to be ineffective. The Blue-Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense has
recommended that the Department of Homeland Security abandon the program, and look to
replace BioWatch with a practical bio-detection program (Biodefense, 2016).
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Ebola as a case study
What can be learned from the 2014 Ebola outbreak? Both socially and psychologically,
the United States is unprepared for a major pandemic, whether it be introduced naturally or by
malicious intent. The parallels between a naturally occurring pandemic and a bioterror attack are
important, as similar challenges and operational shortcomings arise under both circumstances
(O’Grady, 2015). The rapid spread and severity of the Ebola outbreak caused panic not just in
the infected countries, but other countries worldwide (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). This is particularly
relevant as the intention of biological attacks is not just to disrupt economic activity and create
mass causalities, but to manufacture public hysteria (Langmuir & Andrews, 1952).
As Ebola was spreading in 2014, policymakers and health officials were forced to fight a
war on two fronts. While they were attempting to map out and slow the infection spreading
across western Africa, they were simultaneously confronting an “epidemic of fear” occurring
domestically within the United States (Behman & Frieden, 2015). The media, and social media,
contributed to a massive misunderstanding of the situation and the risk that Ebola presented
(Behman & Frieden, 2015). This is consistent with the predictions of the Dark Winter exercise,
the monumental challenge of maintaining effective communication by governmental agencies to
disseminate factual and accurate information. The general public in the United States perceived
Ebola to be a massive health risk, when in reality, not more than a few individuals were infected
with the disease domestically. We can infer that based on the panic induced by a minimal
amount of cases of the infection, if there was a substantial outbreak in a close proximity, how
easily mass panic could impact could evolve into social unrest and economic breakdown
(Gottlieb, 2014).

Reflecting Back on the Ebola Outbreak and the Future of Bioterrorism
Terrorist organizations, as well as aspiring terrorists, have witnessed the overaction and
panic caused by the presence of a few Ebola patients in the United States. This panic is
demonstrated by something as basic as social media. When the Ebola crisis was at its peak in
Liberia (on September 28, 2014) American’s were tweeting about twelve times per minute about
EVD. Two days later, after the admittance of the first infected person, Thomas Duncan, into the
United States, twitter users were posting more than 6,000 times per minute about the virus.
(Garrett, 2015). This panic is the result of a number of key factors: the dissemination of
factually incorrect information, sensationalized reporting, the foreign origin of the virus, and the
exotic sounding name - Ebola (Haelle, 2014). The true power of fear and misinformation became
evident, such as when military units set for deployment into Somalia were cancelled out of fears
they could spread the virus(Salaam-Blyther, 2014).
Partially in an attempt to quell public anxieties, and partially to prevent further
proliferation of the disease, quarantine measures were implemented to prohibit the movement of
people and products (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Within some quarantine zones, mistrust of the
government grew and violence resulted (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). A bioterrorist attack could result
in further dilapidation of the central state and social control as the respective society is forced to
deal with the protocols implemented following an attack.
Despite the fact that air travel presented minimal risk of spreading Ebola, flights were
cancelled into infected countries (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Prior to the outbreak, international
flights to the United States were already required to report to the CDC passengers with certain
illnesses and symptoms when advancing towards the United States (Cole, 2014). Nations
implemented quarantine and border security protocols (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). This was largely
done in efforts to prevent mass hysteria. Instead of a moratorium on international flights and port
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of entry screenings, the CDC assured that exit based screening from infected nations would be a
more effective and economic means of curtaining the spread of the virus (Wasem, 2014).
Within the United States, the health system has the authority following a biological attack
to implement quarantine and isolation measures to prevent the spread of infectious disease (Cole,
2014). These are derived from Congressional authority under the commerce clause as well as the
Public Health Service Act (Cole, 2014). The CDC asserted that mandatory quarantines were an
ineffective measure to limit the spread of the Ebola virus (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). Still, many
governments exercised quarantine measures, prohibiting the movement of people (SalaamBlyther, 2014). These restrictions threatened regional economies, as well as inhibited the
movement of goods across borders (Wasem, 2014). Should the United States experience a
bioterrorist attack, this would not only put enormous economic strain on the nation to clean up
and respond to the attack, but would also lead to quarantines which could cripple the domestic
economy. It would be increasingly difficult to create a firm quarantine as a majority of
American borders are porous land based borders (Wasem, 2014).
The Ebola crisis identified a lack of central command present in the United States when
responding to biological incidents (O’Grady, 2015). Most of the administration’s responses were
decided in tandem between the Director of Center for Disease Control and the Homeland
Security Advisor (Bradner, 2014). When the President did finally appoint a central command
figure – Ron Klain – he appointed an experienced bureaucrat without a medical background who
reported to both the President’s National Security and Homeland Security Advisors (Tapper,
2014). This again, is a confirmation of the Dark Winter experiment – a lack of central command
within the United States. Though the President eventually did appoint a central figure, it was late
in the crisis and he was responsible for reporting two others.
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Conclusions
The United States must continue to invest in efforts to prevent large scale pandemics. In
many cases, the steps required to protect the population from a natural pandemic, are the same
steps required to guard against bioterrorist attacks (Farmer, 2017). Policy makers cannot view
these incidents, or their responses, as mutually exclusive. There is a continued need for better
biological prevention and response. Congress can allocate more funding for - or at minimum
continue the funding at the current levels of commitment - Project BioShield (Talent & Graham,
2016). This program was created to ensure the availability of CBRN countermeasures in the
event of a terrorist attack. Without funding the program enough to develop and purchase the
necessary countermeasures, they will not be available to the American people when needed.
At the time of the outbreak in 2014, there was no vaccination for Ebola (Thiessen, 2014).
Experimental vaccination developed since that time have proven to be very promising but still
remain in the trial phase (Berlinger, 2016). Imagine if countermeasures had been developed for
Ebola as envisioned under Project BioShield? It is not impractical to think that these could have
been used to diminish the fatalities caused by Ebola. The United States failed to respond to a
small pox attack during the Dark Winter simulation, with stockpiled doses of a small pox vaccine
available (Thiessen, 2014). Since most antibiotics and vaccinations are not profitable, there is
little incentive to produce them in the open market (Talent & Graham, 2016). With additional
funding, the perfected Zmapp drug could someday provide the much need cure for the Ebola
virus, saving millions of lives and dollars in the long haul. The Ebola crisis demonstrated the
global need to develop vaccinations immediately following the outbreak of an epidemic (Farmer,
2017).
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The United States needs to invest in the development of modern vaccinations, antivirals,
and antibiotics; especially ones capable and adaptable for neutralizing potential pandemics
(Osterholm, 2017). Vaccination production for some viruses remains obsolete (Gupta, 2017),
with it taking nearly a decade to develop, approve, and license a new vaccination (Farmer, 2017).
With the aid of modern technology and developments in genomic sequencing, the promise of
DBA vaccinations can lead to vaccinations which are more effective, and can be created more
efficiently (Gupya, 2017). To effectively combat the spread of pandemics, vaccination
production needs to be reduced to a matter of months (Farmer, 2017).
Congress must create additional grants to expand research in these fields and create other
incentives to continue research into developing these important technologies deemed unfeasible.
As former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John Brennan, has pointed out, the
response to biothreats has lagged “behind the technology driving it” (Biodefense, 2016).
Congress must consider reforming the drug-patent process, to incentivize research and
development. The goal of this reform should be to “reward” pharmaceutical companies for
developments in vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics.
Vaccinations should be required of the general public. The CDC is deeply involved in a
war of public opinion regarding the ethicalness, necessity, and legality of vaccinations. Congress
needs to take a stance on the side of public health, and pass legislation to mandate vaccinations.
Congress should allocate additional funding to the executive agencies to promote, encourage,
and educate the public on the importance of vaccinations. At the end of the day, having an
immunized population reduces the list of the potential biological agents which can be employed
in a bioterrorism attack.
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Members of the United States armed forces, healthcare professionals, and first responders
are trained to avoid infectious endemic diseases like Ebola (Jansen, 2014). The CDC provides an
abundance of resources directed towards states, local governments, healthcare facilities, and
emergency operators, which explain protocols in the event of both pandemics and biological
attacks (Preparation, 2013). Resources also include information on identifying potential
biological threats and the provision of emergency contact information for government offices
such as the Department of Health, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Centers for
Disease Control (Preparation, 2013).
While resources are made available to private citizens, they are not easily accessible. The
federal government needs to make a stronger effort to “push” this information onto the public in
the same way that information regarding earthquake preparation, storm preparation, and fire
safety are pushed to the community. Pamphlets can be distributed teaching basic preparation,
response, protection, and contact information. The more information the public has, the more
prepared they will be should an attack occur.
The need to improve communication is once again a reminder that the United States
needs to designate one agency -or person – as the authority during a biological incident
(O’Grady, 2015). With the DOD, DHS, USAID, and the CDC (a division of the Department of
Health and Human Services) are all involved in addressing the situation, there is a need for a
final say. While the Obama administration did eventually appoint an Ebola czar, it would have
been far too late had it been an act of terrorism infecting American’s at home. It would be
prudent to designate the line of command in the event of a bioterror attack. This could be
achieved through an Executive Order, and it seems like the most pragmatic choice would to
delegate control to the CDC.
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Policymakers may view this as a double-edged sword and be reluctant to encourage the
spread of this information through the public, fearing that it will instigate public panic. This
information is already available to the public, however, albeit not readily available. If panic is to
occur regardless then it is most pragmatic to ensure that panic is not occurring simultaneously
with a crisis. An educated citizenry will be better prepared to assist and comply with the
government.
Ebola showed the importance of global health security policy as the response to future
pandemics will be increasingly dependent upon coordinated research and preventative health
programs (Behman & Frieden, 2015). The United States needs to continue lending capital – both
financial and human – to support public health efforts abroad (Salaam-Blyther, 2014). The
Trump administration needs to reconsider budget proposals which cut funding to the National
Institute of Health, the Department of State, and USAID; the agencies responsible for
researching and combating epidemics abroad (Osterholm, 2017). By adopting a proactive
approach, natural epidemics can be addressed long before they evolve into pandemics. This can
be made possible through advanced research, but only if the agencies responsible have the tools
and funding required.
Improving the capabilities of first responders abroad and improving the quality of
healthcare facilities worldwide is absolutely essential for the security of the United States in this
globalized world. Ebola was a strong example of the failures within the health system (Behman
& Frieden, 2015). Far too many healthcare facilities do not meet the standards of modern
medicine. Until these can be improved and modernized, people will remain at risk for contracting
preventable diseases from the healthcare system (Behman & Frieden, 2015). Addressing these
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looming failures will mitigate the spread of naturally occurring pandemics by allocating more
resources to keep them from spiraling out of control.
As highlighted by the fragmented response to the Ebola crisis, the American public
remains susceptible to mass panic. The federal government suffers from a lack of centralized
response. Unfortunately, while events like the Ebola outbreak of 2014 or the Zika outbreak of
2016 demonstrate the need for improvements in public health, public education, intergovernment communications, and biological research; it seems unlikely that these events alone
will be enough to wake policy makers to the threats of biological agents. Moreover, the scarcity
and perceived paltriness of previous bioterrorist attacks may have lured policymakers in to a
false sense of security regarding the threat of bioterrorism. The case remains, the United States
government and the America public are both unprepared to deal with large sale biological events;
created through natural or intentional means. Until these shortcomings are addressed, the security
of the United States is exposed.
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